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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-4-103(2)(j), because this appeal has been transferred to this Court from the Utah 
Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted granting summary judgment in favor 
of AutoZone, rejecting Plaintiffs claim that AutoZone's dress code is a uniform such that 
Plaintiff should be reimbursed by AutoZone for the costs of the clothes he wore to work. 
Standard of review- A decision to grant summaryjudgment is reviewed for correctness. 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433,438 (Utah 1996). In this de novo review, the appellate court 
applies "the same standard as that applied by the trial court." Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 
1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), summaryjudgment is appropriate "if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). These issues 
were preserved below by motion and briefing. See R. 31 (AutoZone's motion);1 R. 249 
(Juricic's opposition memorandum); R. 280 (AutoZone's reply memorandum); R. 288 (Court's 
Memorandum Decision) (attached as Addendum "A" to Juricic's appellate brief); R. 292 
(Final Judgment) (also attached as Addendum "B" to Juricic's appellate brief). 
1
 AutoZone will cite to the Record as follows: "R. 
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2. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of 
AutoZone on Plaintiffs claim that AutoZone's vacation policy violates Utah law. 
Standard of review- same as for issue 1 above. 
3. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of 
AutoZone on Plaintiffs claim that AutoZone's conflict of interest policy violates Utah law. 
Standard of review- same as for issue 1 above. Plaintiff did not raise this issue in his 
docketing statement filed on March 2,2009.2 
4. Whether some of Plaintiff s claims are barred by limitations and/or are moot. 
Standard of review- "'Appellate courts review the issue of mootness de novo.'" Cedar 
Mountain Environmental Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, U 7, 214 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah 
2009) quoting Riverview Trenton R.R. Co. v. DSC, Ltd., 486 F.3d 940, 944 (6th Cir. 2007). 
The same is true on limitations questions, which are questions of law. Davis v. Provo City 
Corp., 2008 UT 59, H 9, 193 P. 3d 86, 88-89 (Utah 2008). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Defendant believes that interpretation of the following statutes and/or rules may be 
determinative of portions of this appeal: 
2
 In the case below, Plaintiff also claimed that an AutoZone policy regarding responsible 
communications was not permissible. The district court granted AutoZone's motion for 
summary judgment on this claim. See R. 31 (AutoZone's motion); R. 249 (Juricic's 
opposition memorandum); R. 280 (AutoZone's reply memorandum); R. 288 (Court's 
Memorandum Decision) (attached as Addendum "A" to Juricic's appellate brief) ; R. 292 
Final Judgment (also attached as Addendum "B" to Juricic's appellate brief). However, 
Plaintiff now has abandoned this claim because it is not discussed in Plaintiffs appeal brief, 
nor is it mentioned in his Docketing Statement filed on March 2,2009. Therefore, AutoZone 
will not address it either. 
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R610-3-2L Uniforms. 
A. Where the wearing of uniforms is a condition of employment, 
the employer shall furnish the uniforms free of charge. 
1. The term "uniform" includes any article of clothing, footwear, 
or accessory of a distinctive design or color required by an employer to be 
worn by employees. 
2. An article of clothing which is associated with a specific 
employer by virtue of an emblem (logo) or distinctive color scheme shall be 
considered a uniform. 
B. The employer may request an amount, not to exceed the actual 
cost of the uniform or $20, whichever is less, as a deposit on each uniform 
required by the employer. The deposit shall be refunded to the employee at the 
time uniform is returned. 
R610-3-4. Filing Procedure and Commencement of Agency Action, [excerpt] 
B. An employee who is denied full payment of wages due or is 
affected or aggrieved by a violation of a statutory provision may file a claim 
with the Division on a form provided by the Division for that purpose. 
1. Besides amounts due an employee for labor or services on a 
time, task, piece, commission, or other reasonable method of calculating the 
amount, wages also includes the following items, if due under an agreement 
with the employer or under a policy of the employer: 
a. vacation; 
b. holiday; 
c. sick leave; 
d. paid time off; and 
e. severance payments and bonuses. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs lawsuit here seeks reimbursement from AutoZone for the clothes he wore 
to work (red shirts and black pants). These were street clothes regarding which AutoZone 
designated only the general colors to be worn at work. In 2003, the Utah Labor Commission 
rejected the claims Plaintiff makes now and concluded such clothes were not uniforms. 
Plaintiff also asserts that AutoZone violated Utah law by having a policy regulating when he 
could use vacation time and by having policies that restricted him from working with 
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AutoZone at times when he had potential conflicts of interest such as work for a competitor. 
Such policies are proper and legitimate exercises of management discretion and business 
choice. If Plaintiff did not like them, he could have ended his at-will employment. The trial 
court appropriately rejected any arguments that AutoZone's actions are improper or illegal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff did not dispute any of the facts outlined by Defendant in its Summary 
Judgment Motion (R. 250-64; 280). Thus, the following are the applicable facts in this case. 
1. David Juricic was first employed with AutoZone in late Spring or early 
Summer of 1997. Deposition of David Juricic (hereafter "Juricic Depo.") at p. 19, line 21 
to p. 20, line 4. (Cited excerpts from Juricic Depo. are available beginning at R. 55). 
2. Juricic worked primarily for AutoZone as an auto parts store salesperson, but 
he also did some parts delivery work. Juricic Depo. at p. 22, lines 16-25; p. 23, lines 1-5. 
3. Juricic remained employed with AutoZone for eleven years, voluntarily retiring 
in July of 2008. No one from AutoZone forced him to retire. Juricic Depo. at p. 20, 
lines 5-18. 
Dress Code Policy 
4. When he was first employed there, the AutoZone dress code required Juricic 
to wear a red knit golf shirt with an AutoZone logo, black pants, black socks, black shoes and 
a black belt. AutoZone provided the shirt at no cost to him and Juricic had to supply the rest 
of the clothes needed to meet the dress code. Juricic Depo. at p. 33, line 2 to p. 34, line 4; 
p. 34, line 10 to p. 35, line 1. 
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5. When he was first employed there, Juricic already owned black pants, black 
socks, black shoes and a black belt. He also used socks prescribed by his doctor. Juricic 
Depo. at p. 35, line 13 to p. 36, line 23, p. 63, line 8 to p. 64, line 5. 
6. Within a few years of when Juricic started working there, probably early in the 
year 2000, AutoZone issued Juricic an Employee Handbook, very similar to the one attached 
as Exhibit "B" (R. 119) to AutoZone's summary judgment memorandum (R. 33). Juricic 
Depo. at p. 43, line 20 to p. 45, line 1. 
7. The Employee Handbooks received by Juricic contained the following 
statements regarding at-will employment: 
Employment with AutoZone is an at-will relationship. This means you and 
AutoZone have the right to terminate your employment at any time, with or 
without cause or notice. No AutoZoner can change this policy verbally or in 
writing. 
Juricic Depo. at p. 43, line 20 to p.45, line 1 and Exhibit "B" at p. 25 (R. 145). 
8. This Employee Handbook changed the AutoZone dress code by requiring 
employees to simply wear a red knit golf shirt (no shade specified), without an AutoZone 
logo on it, and to pay for the red shirt themselves, rather than having AutoZone pay for it. 
The new dress code also continued to require employees to wear and provide their own black 
pants, black socks, black shoes and a black belt. Employees could buy these clothes 
wherever they wished to do so. Juricic Depo. at p. 38, line 22 to p. 39, line 25; p. 49, line 15 
to p. 50, line 21; p. 45, line 15 to p. 57, line 24; p. 60, line 12 to p. 61, line 7. 
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9. A full and complete description of the new dress code is attached as 
Exhibit "C" (R. 185) to AutoZone's summary judgment memorandum (R. 33). Juricic Depo. 
at p. 49, line 15 to p. 50, line 21. 
10. A full and complete description of why Juricic believes the new dress code is 
improper is in papers he drafted, attached as Exhibit "D" (R. 191) to AutoZone's summary 
judgment memorandum (R. 33), and is as follows: 
Noncompliance. 
Failure to comply with the dress code can result in termination of employment. 
This policy is the definition of extortion under Utah State law. You are 
required to buy and wear clothing items, for Autozones benefit, or you will be 
fired. Also you are required to purchase Autozone logo items through its 
required supplier. 
Let's start on page 9 and go to page 13. On this page the Uniform (Dress 
Code) is clearly defined by color and style. It notes that the clothing worn is 
for the benefit of Autozone. The Utah State Labor Commission on uniforms 
states that if clothing is of a distinctive color or logo and is required for 
employment it is a uniform and must be paid for by the employer. Clearly 
page 9-13 notes this. This is the definition of uniform under Utah State Labor 
Commission regulation. Autozone and the State Labor Commission would 
have you believe that since the items can be worn outside work that the 
regulation is not valid. Nowhere in the regulation does it mention if a uniform 
can be worn outside work, or where it can be bought, is a part of the judgement 
on whether it is a uniform. Yet these were deciding factors in my denial. 
(Emphasis in original) Juricic Depo. at p. 47, line 5 to p. 48, line 4; p. 48, line 8 to 
p. 49, line 14. 
11. Juricic did not like or agree with the new AutoZone dress code and wrote 
several letters to AutoZone about it. See Exhibit "E" (R. 200) to AutoZone's summary 
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judgment memorandum (R. 33). He asked AutoZone to pay for the clothes he wore to work 
but AutoZone declined his request. Juricic Depo. at p. 69, line 8 to p. 70, line 13. 
12. In December of 2002, Juricic filed a wage claim with the Utah Labor 
Commission, Antidiscrimination and Labor Division (UALD), asserting the AutoZone dress 
code was a uniform as defined by Utah Labor Commission regulations. See Exhibit "F" 
(R. 211) to AutoZone's summary judgment memorandum (R. 33). He also sought 
reimbursement for the cost of buying red shirts, black pants, etc. Juricic Depo. at p. 12, 
lines 5-25; p. 95, lines 16-22. 
13. On April 3, 2003, after a hearing held on March 11, 2003, a UALD hearing 
officer issued a written decision concluding that the AutoZone dress code was not a uniform 
as defined by Utah Labor Commission regulations and dismissing Juricic's claim. See ruling 
attached as Exhibit "G" (R. 219) to AutoZone's summary judgment memorandum (R. 33); 
Juricic Depo. at p. 66, line 1 to p. 67, line 21; p. 98, lines 11-20; p. 99, line 25 to p. 100, 
line 15. 
14. Juricic appealed this adverse ruling to the UALD Executive Director. See 
Exhibit "H" (R. 225) attached to AutoZone's summaryjudgment memorandum (R. 33). The 
UALD Director agreed with the hearing officer and affirmed that ruling on April 30,2003. 
See ruling attached as Exhibit "I" (R. 229) attached to AutoZone's summary judgment 
memorandum (R. 33); Juricic Depo. at p. 103, line 1 to p. 104, line 10. 
15. Juricic appealed this adverse ruling to the Utah Third District Court. He 
believed his view of the law should apply rather than the view of the Labor Commission. 
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However, Judge Iwasaki dismissed this appeal, without prejudice, on December 8,2004 for 
failure to prosecute it. See Exhibit "J" (R. 33) attached to AutoZone's summary judgment 
memorandum (R. 33) Juricic has not pursued that appeal since that dismissal. Juricic Depo. 
at p. 104, line 11 to p. 105, line 22; p. 117, lines 6-13. 
16. There was no AutoZone restriction on where else Juricic could wear the clothes 
that he wore to work. Although Juricic has on occasion worn his red shirt and black pants 
on the street and/or in public places away from or after work, no one has ever come up to him 
and said words to the effect of "hey, I recognize those clothes, you must work at AutoZone." 
Juricic Depo. at p. 65, lines 7-23; p. 68, lines 5-15. 
17. Juricic admits he voluntarily chose to stay employed with AutoZone for about 
8 years after he learned about the AutoZone dress code that he did not like. Juricic Depo. at 
p. 46, line 22 to p. 47, line 4; p. 70, line 5 to p. 71, line 1. 
18. Juricic admits he could have tried, but chose not to try, to find another job after 
he learned about the AutoZone dress code that he did not like. Juricic Depo. at p. 70, line 5 
top. 71, line 1. 
Vacation Use-It-Or-Lose-It Policy 
19. From the time Juricic started working there, or shortly thereafter, AutoZone has 
had a use-it-or-lose-it provision in its vacation policy, allowing employees to only carry over 
up to about 40 hours of unused paid vacation time from one year to the next. Juricic Depo. 
at p. 41, lines 10-19; p. 42, lines 11-22. 
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20. A full and complete description of the AutoZone vacation time use-it-or-lose-it 
policy is attached as Exhibit "K" (R. 237) attached to AutoZone's summary judgment 
memorandum (R. 33). Juricic Depo. at p. 75, line 19 to p. 76, line 22. 
21. A full and complete description of why Juricic believes the vacation time use-
it-or-lose-it policy is improper is in papers he drafted, attached as Exhibit "D" (R. 191) to 
AutoZone's summary judgment memorandum (R. 33), and is as follows: 
Page 54. Vacation Carry Over. You may only carry over a maximum of 40 
hours past March Tst. Yeah right. Anything over 40 hours is wiped off your 
record. Like Theft of Services can be made Legal. You have worked the 
prescribed contract, but now they can decide not to pay you based on a contract 
regulation. Once you have earned the hours they have to pay you. Taking 
money from you after you have fulfilled a contract, without your consent is 
illegal and a felony. According to Autozone, just putting the requirement in 
a contract is justified for taking the money from you without your consent. 
Theft, and Theft of Services is illegal. 
* * * 
Carry over. 
You may carry over a maximum of 40 Hours past March Tst. Known as 
Use-It-Or-Lose-It. There is no way a company can deny payment for 
performance completed under any contract. This is Breach-Of-Contract for 
failure to pay for services performed and also Theft-Of-Services under contract 
law. Neither of which are legal. 
* * * 
Autozone will not pay out for vacation time earned. Theirs is a 
Use-It-Or-Lose-It policy. You are required by Autozone to take your vacation 
time or lose the monies accrued for vacation. No company can tell me how I 
have to use the money I have earned for performance under any contract. They 
are not my legal guardians, nor can that act as such. My money is mine to use 
as I see fit and Autozone cannot tell me I have to take a vacation or lose the 
monies earned for vacation. That is Breach-Of-Contract and Theft-Of-
Services under the contract laws of the State of Utah and U.S. Law. 
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(Emphasis in original) Juricic Depo. at p. 47, line 5 to p. 48, line 4; p. 74, line 15 to p. 75; 
line 13. 
22. During his deposition, Juricic could not identify any paid vacation hours he has 
lost as a result of this use-it-or-lose-it policy. Juricic Depo. at p. 78, lines 8-12; p. 118, 
lines 3-14. 
23. Juricic admits that paid vacation time is a fringe benefit of employment and 
that AutoZone could choose not to offer any of its employees any vacation time at all. Juricic 
Depo. at p. 77, lines 15-23. 
24. Juricic admits he voluntarily chose to stay employed with AutoZone for about 
8 years after he learned about the AutoZone vacation time use-it-or-lose-it policy that he did 
not like. Juricic Depo. at p. 46, line 22 to p. 47, line 4; p. 78, line 18 to p. 79, line 15. 
25. Juricic admits he could have tried, but chose not to try, to find another job after 
he learned about the AutoZone vacation time use-it-or-lose-it policy that he did not like. 
Juricic Depo. at p. 78, line 18 to p. 79, line 15. 
Policy Prohibiting Work for a Competitor 
26. From the time Juricic started working there, or shortly thereafter, AutoZone has 
had a policy prohibiting conflicts of interest caused by employees working after hours for 
AutoZone competitors while working at the same time for AutoZone. Juricic Depo. at 
p. 42, lines 7-10; p. 42, line 23 to p. 43, line 3. 
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27. A full and complete description of the AutoZone conflict of interest policy is 
attached as Exhibit "L" (R. 239) to AutoZone's summary judgment memorandum (R. 33). 
Juricic Depo. at p. 80, lines 13 to p. 81, line 3. 
28. A full and complete description of why Juricic believes the conflict of interest 
policy is improper is in papers he drafted, attached as Exhibit "D" (R. 191) to AutoZone's 
summary judgment memorandum (at R. 33), and is as follows: 
Conflicts. 
I may not participate in any enterprise in competition with Autozone. 
Autozone does not own me, nor do they have an exclusive contract with me or 
my time. I am an independent contractor that sells my time to whomever I 
choose. Autozone does not have the right to restrict my selling my time to 
whomever I choose. I am not owned by them. Involuntary Servitude and 
Slavery are forbidden by law. They cannot control my time when I am not 
employed at Autozone. 
* * * 
Page 36. Conflicts of interest. You may not participate in any enterprise in 
competition with Autozone. Right. They own you and all your time. They 
can regulate any of your time, even whe [sic] you are not being paid by 
Autozone. All your time is theirs to regulate as they see fit. Wrong. I am not 
the property of Autozone. I am an independent contractor of my time, and I 
choose whom I will sell it to, not Autozone. They cannot take away my rights 
to be employed as I see fit simply by making a regulation in an employment 
contract. That right does not exist. Again, I cannot be legally compelled to 
submit to or perform illegal acts. My time is mine to do with as I see fit. 
(Emphasis in original) Juricic Depo. at p. 47, line 5 to p. 48, line 4; p. 79, line 16 to p. 80, 
line 12. 
29. While working at AutoZone, Juricic did not ever apply for, receive or decline 
a job offer from a competitor of AutoZone. Instead, he worked as much overtime as he could 
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at AutoZone stores and thus admits he probably made more money on overtime pay than he 
would have made working for a competitor after his AutoZone work hours were completed. 
Juricic Depo at p. 84, line 25 to p. 85, line 23. 
30. Juricic admits that although he does not agree with it, he understands that a 
prohibition on working for a competitor can have legitimate business purposes such as 
protecting trade secrets and avoiding confusion for customers. Juricic admits that he 
voluntarily chose to stay employed with AutoZone for many years after he learned about the 
AutoZone conflict of interest policy that he did not like. Juricic Depo. at p. 46, line 22 to 
p. 47, line 4; p. 83, line 19 to p. 84, line 24; p. 87, line 21 to p. 88, line 4. 
31. Juricic admits he could have tried, but chose not to try, to find another job after 
he learned about the AutoZone conflict of interest policy that he did not like. Juricic Depo. 
at p. 87, line 21 to p. 88, line 8. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff started the first of the legal proceedings related to this dispute in December 
of 2002. At that time, Juricic filed a wage claim with the Utah Labor Commission, 
Antidiscrimination and Labor Division (UALD), asserting that the AutoZone dress code was 
a uniform as defined by Utah Labor Commission regulations. He sought reimbursement for 
the cost of buying red shirts, black pants, etc. (R. 211). 
On April 3, 2003, after a hearing held on March 11, 2003, a UALD hearing officer 
issued a written decision concluding that the AutoZone dress code was not a uniform as 
defined by Utah Labor Commission regulations and dismissing Juricic's claim. Juricic 
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appealed this adverse ruling to the UALD Executive Director, who agreed with the hearing 
officer's order in favor of AutoZone and affirmed it on April 30,2003. (R. 219; 225; 229). 
Juricic appealed this adverse ruling to the Utah Third District Court in the Spring of 
2003. Apparently, he believed his view of the law should apply rather than the view of the 
Utah Labor Commission that drafted the applicable regulation. However, Judge Iwasaki 
dismissed this appeal on December 8, 2004 as a result of Juricic's failure to prosecute it. 
Juricic has not pursued that appeal since that dismissal (R. 233). 
Instead, Juricic filed this lawsuit in Third District Court on November 30,2007. On 
October 17, 2008, after discovery was completed, Defendant filed a motion for summary 
judgment with the undisputed facts based entirely on admissions made by Plaintiff during his 
deposition. After all briefs were filed, the trial court granted the Defendant's motion for 
summary judgment in a Memorandum Decision dated January 3, 2009. The court entered 
final judgment on January 15,2009. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this appeal. (R. 295). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The AutoZone dress code policy does not constitute a uniform as that term has been 
defined and interpreted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
Plaintiffs arguments confuse designated color of clothing, which is not a uniform, 
with distinctive clothing, which is a uniform. In this case AutoZone designates colors to be 
worn to work, but the clothes involved are normal street clothes. Designating certain colors 
is not enough to create a uniform. Under the relevant Labor Commission regulation defining 
uniforms, designated work clothes only become a uniform: (1) when they are of a "distinctive 
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design or color" or (2) when "associated with a specific employer by virtue of an emblem 
(logo) or distinctive color scheme." Utah Administrative Code R610-3-21. 
As further proof of these points, in 2003, the Utah Labor Commission resolved 
Plaintiffs identical claim brought under identical facts. The Utah Labor Commission, which 
promulgated the regulation at issue, concluded that AutoZone's designation of colors is 
neither a distinctive color scheme nor a distinctive design or color and thus is not a uniform. 
Thus, Plaintiffs uniform claim fails. 
Furthermore, AutoZone's use-it-or-lose-it vacation pay policy and conflict of interest 
policy both are proper under Utah law. 
As with the uniform policy, the Utah Labor Commission has resolved the vacation 
policy dispute. Its "Frequently Asked Questions" web page states, "In general, Utah labor 
law does not require an employer to provide benefits to its employees. If an employer does 
establish a policy or practice of providing benefits they are expected to abide by the policy 
or practice in a non-discriminatory manner." See http://laborcommission.utah.gov/ 
FAO.html#Wage3. Thus, an employer like AutoZone can adopt a use-it-or-lose-it vacation 
policy, or no policy at all, without violating Utah law. Utah law simply enforce a consistent 
and nondiscriminatory employer's policy as is. This Court should do so here too by rejecting 
Plaintiffs claim against it, just as the trial court did. 
AutoZone's conflict of interest policy also is appropriate under Utah law, which does 
not require an employer to continue employing someone who, at the same time, is working 
for a competitor. Plaintiff points to no governing authority suggesting such a policy is 
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invalid. Indeed, employees have a duty of loyalty to an employer which supports such a 
policy. 
Furthermore, if Juricic did not like AutoZone's conditions of at-will employment, he 
did not have to work there nor was AutoZone required to retain him. By staying there, under 
Utah law, Juricic accepted employment subject to the conditions of which he now complains. 
Plaintiffs claims, or at least some, are barred by applicable statutes of limitations as 
they arise from actions taken many years ago while Juricic was still employed with 
AutoZone. Indeed, many of Plaintiffs claims arose at least eight years ago when he became 
aware of the various policies with which he takes issue here. He could have and should have 
pursued his claims at that time. Thus, Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part by 
these applicable limitations periods. 
Finally, Plaintiffs claims about the vacation and no-work-for-competitors policies are 
all moot. Juricic no longer works at AutoZone and cannot identify damages he allegedly 
incurred related to these policies, which no longer apply to him. Because no requested relief 
will affect the rights of the parties on these issues, the case is moot on these points and these 
claims should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT AUTOZONE'S 
DRESS CODE POLICY IS NOT A UNIFORM. 
Under the undisputed facts and the applicable law, the AutoZone dress code policy 
does not constitute a uniform as that term has been defined and interpreted by the Utah Labor 
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Commission. Therefore, Plaintiffs claim seeking reimbursement for alleged uniforms fails 
and the trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
No Utah statute requires that employers pay for uniforms. However, apparently 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 34-28-1 and related provisions (the Utah statutes regarding 
payment of wages), the Utah Labor Commission has issued a regulation defining what is a 
uniform and when an employer must pay for it. The relevant Utah Administrative Code 
regulation states as follows: 
R610-3-21. Uniforms. 
A. Where the wearing of uniforms is a condition of employment, the 
employer shall furnish the uniforms free of charge. 
1. The term "uniform" includes any article of clothing, footwear, or 
accessory of a distinctive design or color required by an employer to be worn 
by employees. 
2. An article of clothing which is associated with a specific employer by 
virtue of an emblem (logo) or distinctive color scheme shall be considered a 
uniform. 
B. The employer may request an amount, not to exceed the actual cost of 
the uniform or $20, whichever is less, as a deposit on each uniform required 
by the employer. The deposit shall be refunded to the employee at the time 
uniform is returned. 
The AutoZone dress code at issue here simply requires employees to wear black pants 
(non-denim), black socks, a black belt and a red golf shirt (without any kind of a corporate 
logo on it). The employee must buy his/her own clothes at a retailer or other vendor of 
his/her choice. These are street clothes that an employee can also wear anytime after work 
and anywhere else he or she chooses to wear them. See Fact Nos. 8-9, 16. 
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The Utah Labor Commission has already determined, under the same exact facts of 
this case (and after already hearing Plaintiffs same exact arguments), that the AutoZone 
dress code is not a uniform under the applicable Utah Labor Commission regulation. In 
December of 2002, Plaintiff filed with the Utah Labor Commission the very same dress code 
claim he now has filed with this Court. See Fact Nos. 11-12. In two separate decisions 
rendered in April of 2003. (R. 219; 229), Utah Labor Commission officials interpreted their 
own regulation on uniforms and rejected Juricic's arguments that the AutoZone dress code 
was a uniform. See Fact Nos. 13-14. 
In both cases, the Utah Labor Commission noted that AutoZone's dress code 
contained no distinct color scheme. The first hearing officer explained (on p. 3 of his 
opinion): 
I have never looked at anyone in my neighborhood in black slacks and tan knit 
shirt and thought there goes an AutoZone employee. There is nothing 
distinctive or unique about those color combinations that lead me to conclude 
the wearer is in a uniform. In my opinion, requiring dark slacks, skirts, shoes, 
belts and socks are reasonable business policies. Further, the identified shirt 
color and styles, which are worn daily by thousands of individuals, who have 
no association with Respondent, are not sufficiently distinct (underlining for 
emphasis) in design or color to be a uniform. 
See Fact No. 13 (emphasis in original) (R. 221). 
On appeal, the Executive Director of the UALD agreed and stated, "A dress code 
which requires tan, red or gray shirts, knit and/or oxford with black slacks, jackets or gray 
sweaters, available in any clothing store, does not constitute clothing 'of a distinct 
(underlining for emphasis) design or color. The clothing required need not bear a logo or 
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other identifying marks and may be worn in any work or casual setting." See Fact No. 14 
(emphasis in original) (R. 229). Juricic failed to prosecute the Third District Court appeal 
he filed in response to these decisions and that appeal was dismissed in December of 2004. 
See Fact No. 15 (R. 234). 
Plaintiffs claim here confuses designation of colors, which is not a uniform, with 
distinctive clothing, which is a uniform. In this case, AutoZone simply designates colors to 
be worn to work. Plaintiff contends that the AutoZone dress code is a uniform because it 
designates colors that employees should wear to work. However, designating certain colors 
is not enough. Under the relevant Labor Commission regulation defining uniforms, 
designated work clothes only become a uniform: (1) when they are of a "distinctive design 
or color" or (2) when "associated with a specific employer by virtue of an emblem (logo) or 
distinctive color scheme." No such circumstances are present here. 
Juricic's deposition admissions confirm that the AutoZone dress code does not create 
a distinctive color scheme. He admits no shade of red is designated by the dress code, and 
that he already owned black shoes, socks and a belt before he ever worked at AutoZone. He 
also admits he would wear the same socks regardless because his doctor has prescribed them 
for him. See Fact Nos. 8,16. A casual internet search shows black/red are more identifiable 
as a distinctive color scheme worn by fans of the Chicago Bulls or Houston Rockets rather 
than AutoZone. See http://hoopedia.nba.com/index.php/Team_Colors. Moreover, Juricic 
specifically concedes the observations cited above of the Labor Commission, noting that 
although he has worn the clothes at issue in public places other than work, no one has ever 
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come up to him and recognized him as an AutoZone employee based on the color of his 
clothes. See Fact No. 16. 
The Utah Labor Commission correctly interpreted its own regulation. There is no 
reason for a different conclusion. The trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
II. AUTOZONE'S VACATION POLICY DOES NOT VIOLATE UTAH LAW. 
AutoZone' s use-it-or-lose-it vacation pay policy (see Fact Nos. 19-20) is proper under 
Utah law. An employer has the right/discretion to set the terms and conditions of such fringe 
benefits. The trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
Throughout this case, Plaintiff has failed to cite to any authority whatsoever in support 
of his claim that Utah law prohibits an employer from including a use-it-or-lose-it provision 
in its vacation pay policy. Moreover, once again, the Utah Labor Commission confirms the 
validity of AutoZone's policy by stating that an employer has the discretion to set benefits, 
including by not giving any benefits at all. 
Utah Administrative Code R610-3-4(B)(l) provides that the term "wages also 
includes the following items i/due under an agreement with the employer or under a policy 
of the employer: a. vacation; b. holiday; c. sick leave; d. paid time off; and e. severance 
payments and bonuses." (Emphasis added). In addition, the Utah Labor Commission's 
"Frequently Asked Questions" web page provides the following guidance: 
Q: Is an employer required to provide paid vacation, holiday pay, sick leave 
or severance pay? 
A: In general, Utah labor law does not require an employer to provide benefits 
to its employees. If an employer does establish a policy or practice of 
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providing benefits they are expected to abide by the policy or practice in a non-
discriminatory manner. 
See http://laborcommission.utah.gOv/FAO.html#Wage3. 
AutoZone has established its policy and consistently followed it, and Plaintiff has not 
presented evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, an employer such as AutoZone can adopt 
a use-it-or-lose-it vacation policy, or no vacation policy at all, without violating Utah law. 
III. AUTOZONE'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICY IS NOT IMPROPER 
UNDER UTAH LAW. 
AutoZone's conflict of interest policy does not violate Utah law. A Utah employer 
has the right to refuse to continue to employ someone who works for a competitor at the 
same time. As a result, the trial court's summary judgment decision below was correct. 
Despite how Plaintiff tries to characterize this issue, as a matter of freedom-for-the-
working-man-after-hours, AutoZone does not deny an employee that freedom to choose. But 
freedom's choices have consequences, so AutoZone's policy indicates that an employee can 
be discharged if he/she chooses to work for a competitor while working for AutoZone at the 
same time. See Fact Nos. 26-27. Plaintiffs claim properly failed below because he was 
employed at will, meaning AutoZone could discharge him for no reason at all. See Fact 
Nos. 6-7. Having such widespread discretion to terminate without cause, it could certainly 
reserve the right discharge him for an actual reason, such as working for a competitor. No 
Utah law prohibits such a discharge and in fact, Utah law allows it. 
Utah courts have noted that an employee owes an employer a duty of loyalty not to 
act contrary to the employer's legitimate business interests, including regarding matters of 
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competition. See, e.g., Prince Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, %f 21 -22,94 P.3d 
179,184-85 (Utah 2004), citing to Restatement (Second) of Agency §393 (1958). A policy 
allowing employers to discharge those employees who moonlight for a competitor does 
nothing more than enforce this duty of employee loyalty and recognize the at-will nature of 
the employment relationship. Moreover, Utah courts have not hesitated to grant injunctive 
relief to enforce restrictive post-employment noncompetition covenants in appropriate 
circumstances. See, e.g., Kasco Services Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86 (Utah 1992); System 
Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d421 (Utah 1983). Similar pre-termination policies also are 
proper, again considering that the relationship is at-will as it was here. 
Even if Utah did have a statute regulating this issue, Juricic's claim still would fail. 
Unlike in Utah, in Colorado, an employer cannot discharge an employee for engaging in 
"lawful activities off the premises of an employer during nonworking hours." Colo. Rev. 
Stat. § 24-34-402.5. However, there are exceptions to this law that permit employers to 
restrict the off-duty conduct of their employees: (1) when it relates to a bona fide 
occupational requirement; or (2) if it is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest, or 
appearance of conflict of interest, with any responsibilities that the employee owes to the 
employer. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402.5(l)(a)(b). 
Even Juricic concedes that there are legitimate employer interests in such situations. 
For example, during his deposition he agreed that it could endanger Pepsi's credibility or 
confidentiality to have a Pepsi research and development employee also work for Coke on 
his off hours at night. Juricic also agreed it could cause problems for a John McCain 
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campaign strategist to moonlight for the Barack Obama campaign. See Fact No. 30. Despite 
recognizing these legitimate employer interests, however, Juricic also has asserted that an 
employer could do nothing about such problems. See relevant Juricic deposition excerpts 
attached as Exhibit "N" (R. 246) to AutoZone's summary judgment memorandum (R. 33) 
and Fact Nos. 28, 30. 
AutoZone has the right to adopt such a policy to avoid the conflicts and confusion 
created by an employee who by day touts AutoZone's products as the best and most effective 
products but who, by night, tries to do the very same thing for AutoZone's competition. 
Other courts have rejected Juricic's arguments in similar situations. See, e.g., Hartt v. Sony 
Electronics Broadcasting & Professional Co., 69 Fed. Appx. 889,890 (9th Cir. 2003) (former 
employees allege employer discharged them for moonlighting outside of their regular 
employment failed to state a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, 
under California law; there was no established public policy against terminating employees 
for moonlighting); Barton v. Innolink Systems, Inc., 2004 WL 1284203, *7 (Del Super. 
2004) (employer had just cause to terminate employee who was moonlighting and thus 
creating risk of conflict of interest or lost business opportunity for employer). 
Thus, Plaintiffs claims regarding his alleged right to moonlight appropriately failed 
on summary judgment. 
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IV. JURICIC'S EMPLOYMENT, AND/OR CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT, 
CONSTITUTED ACCEPTANCE OF AUTOZONE'S VARIOUS TERMS 
OF EMPLOYMENT. 
If Juricic did not like AutoZone's conditions of employment, he did not have to work 
there. By staying employed at AutoZone, he accepted employment subject to the conditions 
of which he now complains. This provides another basis for affirming the decision of the 
trial court. Plaintiff provides no case law support for his contrary views, but ample authority 
supports the position of AutoZone on this point. 
A Utah employer may change the nature/terms of at-will employment "unilaterally." 
Johnsonv.KimberlyClarkWorldwidefIna9S6¥.Supp.2dlll9,1121 (D.Utah2000). The 
Utah Supreme Court has held: 
In the case of unilateral contract for employment, where an at-will employee 
retains employment with knowledge of new or changed conditions, the new or 
changed conditions may become a contractual obligation. In this manner, an 
original employment contract may be modified or replaced by a subsequent 
unilateral contract. The employee's retention of employment constitutes 
acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the 
job, although free to leave, the employment supplies the necessary 
consideration for the offer. 
Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1002 (Utah 1991). 
For example, in Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores Inc., 972 P.2d 395 (Utah 1998), the 
plaintiff alleged that at the time he was hired he had an express contract, rather than an at-
will arrangement. A few days after he was hired, the plaintiff received a copy of the 
defendant's employee handbook. But the plaintiff still spoke with his supervisor about his 
"concern" over the at-will language. However, "[although he told [his supervisor] he could 
not believe that [the at-will provision] was Dan's policy, he also acknowledged that he 
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understood it." Id. at 399. A couple years later the plaintiff was terminated and he initiated 
a wrongful discharge suit. Addressing the plaintiffs claim that when he was hired he had 
an express employment contract, the court concluded that, 
even if [plaintiffs] statement that [the employer's conduct upon his hire] 
created an express or implied contract, as a matter of contract law, [plaintiffs] 
receipt of the . . . employee handbook and his signing of the acknowledgment 
form modified and superseded any pervious conditions of that contract. 
Id. at 401. Although the court notes that the plaintiff signed for the handbook, this was not 
a crucial or necessary factor in the court's decision. Rather, the decision turned on the 
plaintiffs continued employment in spite of his awareness of the changed condition. The 
court held that, "when an employee admittedly has knowledge of a distributed handbook's 
provision that modifies the employment contract and continues to work for the employer after 
gaining such knowledge, the modified contract prevails, and previous, contradictory 
conditions have no effect." Id. 
In Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), the plaintiff 
argued that his employer's oral statements at hiring created an express contract of 
employment. And as in Ryan, an employee handbook was subsequently distributed that 
explained that the defendant was an "at-will" employer. The plaintiff received the handbook 
and was aware of the "at-will" provision. The case does not state whether the plaintiff signed 
an acknowledgment form. The court held that: 
Even if we agree with [plaintiff], if an employee has knowledge of a 
distributed handbook that changes a condition of the employee's employment, 
and the employee remains in the company's employ, the modified conditions 
become part of the employee's employment contract. 
* * * 
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[Plaintiff] retained his employment with [defendant] with full knowledge of 
the modified condition of his employment and his retention constituted his 
acceptance of [defendant's] offer: to retain employed at [defendant] as an at-
will employee. 
Id. at 1313-14. 
Similarly, in Hansen v. America Online, Inc., 2004 UT 62,96 P.3d 950 (Utah 2004), 
this Court upheld the termination of employees fired for bringing weapons on their 
employer's property despite a rule to the contrary and despite the employee's alleged 
constitutional right to bear arms. The court noted the employees could work elsewhere if 
they did not like the employer's rule, stating, "Those who are unnerved by the prospect of 
engaging unarmed in the human interactions that occur while in transit to and from the 
workplace are, of course, at liberty to seek employment in a workplace which has adopted 
the philosophy that a safe and productive work environment is best achieved with armed 
employees." 2004 UT 62, n.6; 96 P.2d at 953, n.6. 
In the instant matter, as in the cases cited above, Juricic had notice of the changed 
terms and conditions of employment and, based on his objections, understood them. The fact 
that Juricic may not have signed the employee handbook acknowledgment form or otherwise 
indicated his acceptance to the new terms should not be a controlling factor. His continued 
employment in spite of the changed policies controls. See Fact Nos. 17-18, 24-25, 30-31. 
Juricic' s continued employment at AutoZone showed his acceptance of the revised terms and 
conditions of employment. He cannot validly complain of them now. 
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V. JURICIC'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED IN WHOLE OR PART BY 
APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS OR DUE TO 
MOOTNESS. 
Although it is not completely clear, Plaintiffs claims appear to rest on written or 
unwritten contract theories and/or are based on the Utah statutes regarding payment of 
wages. Thus his claims, or at least some of them, are barred by applicable statutes of 
limitations. Some also are moot. The court's decision can be affirmed for these reasons.3 
Utah law imposes the following time limitations on Plaintiff s claims: (1) for penalties 
for failure to pay wages in accordance with statutory requirements-60 days (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 34-28-5(1 )(b)(ii)); (2) for a liability created by a state statute (e.g. the wage payment 
provisions)-3 years (Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(4)); (3) for an obligation not founded on 
a written instrument or for relief not otherwise provided by law- 4 years (Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-2-307( 1), (3)); and (4) for an obligation founded on a written instrument-6 years (Utah 
Code Ann. § 78B-2-309(2)). 
Plaintiffs claims arose at least eight years ago, perhaps longer, when he became 
aware of the various policies with which he takes issue here. See Fact Nos. 1, 4, 6, 11-12, 
17,19,24,26,30. Thus, Plaintiffs claims are barred in whole or in part by these applicable 
limitations periods. 
3
 Although these issues were raised below (R. 33, 51-52), the trial court chose not to 
decide them and instead chose to rule on the merits of the case (R. 289). However, an 
appeals court can affirm a trial court's decision on any grounds apparent from the record. 
See Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, If 20, 52 P.3d 1158, 1164 (Utah 2002). 
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Furthermore, Plaintiffs claims about the use-it-or-lose-it vacation policy and the 
conflict of interest policy are moot because Juricic no longer works at AutoZone and cannot 
identify any damages he allegedly incurred related to any of these policies. 
Utah courts "will not adjudicate issues when the underlying case is moot." Ellis v. 
Swensen92000UT 101,f 25,16P.3dl233,1239 (Utah 2000). "A case is deemed moot when 
the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants/' Id; see also Cedar 
Mountain Environmental Inc. v. Tooele County, 2009 UT 48, f 20,214 P.2d 95,100 (Utah 
2009). In his deposition, Juricic admitted he cannot identify any damages from his vacation 
claim (and that his employer had no obligation to provide paid vacation time anyway), and 
that he never applied to work at a competitor and likely made more money anyway just by 
working overtime at AutoZone. See Fact Nos. 22,23,29. Perhaps most significantly, none 
of these policies apply to Plaintiff anymore because he has retired voluntarily from his 
AutoZone job. See Fact No. 3. 
Thus, no requested relief will affect the rights of the parties against each other on 
these issues. The case is moot on these points and these claims should be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's findings and conclusions and 
judgment should be affirmed in their entirety. 
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